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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to consider two issues: 
 
Is ethical governance the right concept for making people behave properly in Islamic 
Finance? 
 
How do you make people behave properly? 
 
This paper is limited to looking at some case studies, asking some questions and 
suggesting some thoughts. The emphasis is on legal and related aspects. 
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I. IS ETHICAL GOVERNANCE THE RIGHT CONCEPT FOR MAKING 
PEOPLE BEHAVE PROPERLY IN ISLAMIC FINANCE? 
 
Is ethical governance the right concept for ensuring proper conduct in Islamic 
Finance? 
 
Consider the concept of governance. The word has numerous meanings. Let us take it 
in a very wide sense, covering external and internal normative regimes. 
 
The external aspect comprises rules formulated and enforced outside an organisation, 
what one might call ‘regulation’. Types of such rules include law and law’s normative 
offshoots such as self-regulation and the ‘comply or explain’ basis of the United 
Kingdom’s Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 
 
The internal aspect comprises rules which are externally designed, but are internal in 
the sense that they relate to the structure and practices of an organisation. This might 
be called ‘governance’ in a narrower sense. The purpose of internal regimes is to 
ensure that the organisation is properly managed and, in particular, to ensure that each 
group of actors concerned with the organisation (stakeholders) acts in accordance 
with the principle underlying that type of organisation, neither abusing its power nor 
being abused by another group. The most discussed type is Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance. 
 
Ethics is the ‘science of morals’ (Shorter OED). It is clearly distinguished from law. 
 
Both governance and ethics are Western concepts based on Western values. Western 
thought in these areas is, however, dominant. In particular, governance (in the 
narrower sense just sketched), although relatively new, has become extremely 
fashionable, generating its own ‘industry’. Indeed, its popularity can produce absurd 
results, evidence a publisher’s flyer advertising books on ‘Corporate Governance and 
Company Law’. This dominance and popularity are such that the culture-specific 
nature of the two concepts is easily missed. There are lessons to be learnt from the 
literature on legal diffusion in this regard. Possible evidence of hegemony can be 
found in, for example, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2007, which is 
entirely Western in origin and does not mention Islam or the sharia at all. The Code of 
Corporate Governance for Bangladesh 2004 is similar to the Malaysian code. 
Pakistan’s Code of Corporate Governance 2002 is solidly based on the Anglo-Saxon 
model but contains an intriguing section in which the English law concept of fiduciary 
duties is discussed, and justified in terms of the sharia. 
 
And ethics is not akhlaq. 
 
There is therefore a risk inherent in the use of these terms that conceptual hegemony 
be unconsciously granted to the conventional system. In order to avoid that risk, we 
need explicit articulation of that cultural specificity; a consideration of whether ethical 
governance is useful in the quest to attain the aim of Islamic Finance, ie compliance 
with the sharia in financial dealings; and, if the answer is in the affirmative, a 
consideration of whether it should be adapted and, if so, how. 
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Addressing the first question, whether ethical governance is needed in Islamic 
Finance, one can argue that the sharia encompasses ethics (in the sense of akhlaq), so 
all that is necessary is a set of mechanisms to ensure compliance with the sharia. (For 
the sake of simplicity, the form/function debate is ignored here.) 
 
On the other hand, the sharia and Western governance do have many principles in 
common such as the aim of ensuring fairness, transparency and accountability, and 
the usage does have the marketing advantage of giving the impression that IFIs are 
covered by protections similar to those existing in conventional finance. 
 
If the latter argument is accepted, then the concepts do need adaptation. For example, 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance gives pre-eminence to one stakeholder group, 
shareholders. Such pre-eminence is against the (ethical) principles of justice and 
equality in Islam. We also see the need for adaptation in the structural differences 
between IFIs and conventional institutions resulting from compliance with the sharia, 
for example the existence of the group of double mudaraba investment depositors 
which has quite different characteristics from those of conventional bank account 
holders. Such adaptation has already been seen in, say, the IFSB’s broadening of the 
scope of governance to include all relevant groups in IFIs. 
 
How is this adaptation to be effected? 
 
Governance as an explicitly articulated idea is new even in Western legal thought, but 
at least Western law had corporations, whereas the sharia had none. So we cannot 
follow the usual method of adapting mechanisms from the classical sharia. The 
challenges here are demonstrated in the disparate state of the literature on Islamic 
governance. We see references to a range of principles including tawhid, khilafa, ‘adl, 
equality and balance of treatment, social welfare, zakat, maslaha, cooperation, 
accountability, taklif, honesty in trade. Choudhury and Hoque have proposed 
adaptation of the ideas of shura and hisba. Their suggestion is intriguing but it also 
serves as a demonstration of the challenges. In other words, the approach has been, 
and in the absence of specific mechanisms must be, one of recourse to the general 
principles of the maqasid and the qawa’id. Possibilities in this regard are dealt with 
by colleagues and will not be repeated here, except to mention that the normative 
regimes of the legal systems which govern IFIs on the municipal level will also need 
to taken into account. 
 
 
II. HOW DO YOU MAKE PEOPLE BEHAVE PROPERLY? 
 
Whatever the process is called, however it is formulated and whatever the contents of 
its norms, some way of ensuring compliance with the sharia by IFIs needs to be in 
force. What is the best way of achieving this aim? More generally, how does one 
make people behave properly? This question has occupied the minds of many thinkers 
over millennia. 
 
One solution is to make good people who will behave properly because that is the 
way they are made. In this model, the child has good principles instilled into her from 
birth by her family, those principles are reinforced by education. Adults adhere to the 
principles because of their upbringing, deviations are dealt with by peer pressure and 
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other informal mechanisms. Formal rules do exist, but they are fairly simple. They 
operate as a back-up to social mechanisms, indicating by their weight and seriousness 
the importance attached by society to correct behaviour, and they deal with extreme 
cases or those in which social mechanisms have proved inadequate. 
 
Another solution is to rely on formal rules. But rules have well known deficiencies. 
They are crude, imposing a simple world view on a complex world. Attempts to make 
them more sophisticated leads to complexity and less knowledge and understanding 
among those subject to them, more cost to society in terms of legislative processes, 
specialist lawyers, legal education etc. They are subject to different interpretations. 
They need expensive enforcement mechanisms. 
 
An example of the former model can be seen in the Victorian United Kingdom, 
briefly mentioned in the last workshop. It seems that it was the loose morals of the 
18th century which led to a general desire for change. Profound transformations were 
effected. Thomas Arnold, headmaster of Rugby School 1826-1841, was very 
influential in the creation of the ideal of the gentleman. Similar notions motivated the 
British Idealist philosopher and alumnus of Rugby School TH Green, and the 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report 1854 built upon his work, resulting in extensive reform 
including open recruitment and the end of patronage. Queen Victoria set an example 
of dedication in public life. Debt was regarded as morally questionable at best, banks 
were supposed to lend only to those who could afford to repay. 
 
The success of the Victorian reform movement must not be exaggerated. The official 
imposition of a certain moral view of the world created what some people felt was a 
moral straitjacket. In any event the reality departed considerably from the ideal even 
within the parameters of the system, let alone those elements taken for granted and 
which we now find unacceptable such as male domination, oppression in family life, 
societally embedded racism, jingoistic imperialism and a rigid class structure based on 
privilege. Eventually much of that moral view was rejected. But it is nonetheless true 
that, whereas public life in the 18th century rivalled those of many of today’s most 
corrupt regimes, by the end of the Victorian era British systems had become models 
to follow in their ethical standards. So the ‘restrictions and barriers and incentives to 
guide people into good behaviour’ they set up were effective to a significant degree 
(quotation from the transcript of the last workshop, a comment on this author’s 
interjection). 
 
An example of the former model can be seen in the regulatory regime instituted in the 
United Kingdom financial sector upon Big Bang in 1986. The pre-1986 City of 
London still ran on the Victorian model. It was based on the ‘Old Boy Network’, a 
small, close-knit group from the British ruling classes, still dominated by the idea of 
Thomas Arnold’s gentleman whose (spoken) word was his bond - dictum meum 
pactum, the motto of the Stock Exchange. Formal regulation was nugatory. The 
protection provided by the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 was 
laughable; the Bank of England exercised oversight with a ‘tea and biscuits’ 
approach; regulation in the stock market consisted of listing rules and the Companies 
Act. Such regulation as did exist was structural, separating functions, keeping Stock 
Exchange firms British and small and requiring unlimited liability, as befitted a 
gentleman. More was not considered necessary because the Old Boys were seen as 
controlled by their upbringing and by social mechanisms, mainly the principles 
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instilled by a public school education and, if necessary, an informal reminder of those 
principles by your peers or, in extreme cases, exclusion. 
 
This was a comfortable, ‘gentlemanly’ world of relationships, confidentiality (or 
secrecy, depending on one’s point of view) and relatively modest financial gain. 
There was hardly any competition and measures of performance were practically 
unknown. Commission rates in the Stock Exchange were fixed. In reputable banks, 
the balance between credit control and lending departments was in favour of the latter. 
Client bases in City professional firms were stable and fees not negotiable. Solicitor’s 
firms operated what was in effect a cartel, in which competition on fees was not 
possible (by tacit agreement, if a potential client asked for a competitive fee 
quotation, he would be told by all City firms that fees were not negotiable, and that 
there would be calculated in accordance with Law Society guidelines). Hours were 9 
to 5, pressure to perform was modest. 
 
The Thatcher government dismantled this world and replaced it with one based on the 
ideology of competition, markets and public choice. Structural regulation was 
removed, the Stock Exchange was opened up to corporations, including foreign 
institutions, banks were allowed to buy stockbroking houses. Big players came in. 
Social control of behaviour was replaced by enormous amounts of complex formal 
regulation. For instance, you could combine functions and create conflicts of interests 
so long as you obeyed the rules about such conflicts and put systems in place 
(Chinese Walls) to deal with them. Competition became the norm, performance 
measures were introduced everywhere possible, fixed commissions were abolished in 
the Stock Exchange, law firms bid against each other for work. Relationships were 
replaced by transactions, remuneration and profits went up, and were publicised. 
Pressure on individuals and institutions to perform increased, as did working hours. 
Risk aversion was replaced by profit preference. A herd effect appeared, 
paradoxically caused by the competition, profit and measurement motivated culture. 
Institutions and individuals found it almost impossible to stay out of high risk high 
profit areas and the balance between risk-controlling and profit-seeking departments 
shifted in favour of the latter. 
 
The underlying changes were all in line with thatcherite ideology. The idea that 
Margaret Thatcher intended to encourage greed is historical revisionism, but she did 
believe in competition and free markets and had little time for the privileged classes 
and their outlook on life. 
 
This ideology also contributed to real, if not scientifically assessable, changes in 
ethical standards and expectations in society as a whole. Contrast the attitudes of City 
professionals in 1986 and those in 2010. For many in the former group, money and 
ambition were significant but were not major motivating factors in entering the City. 
Family and social expectations and connections and security of employment were just 
as important. Those entering in recent years have grown up in a different atmosphere. 
Without falling into the trap of demonising those working in the financial services 
industry, it is nonetheless true that financial gain is now a major societal aim (and it is 
now socially acceptable to admit it), ambition is instilled from an early age, and once 
in the City, pressure to perform is intense. In society at large debt has become normal. 
It is encouraged by the banks and even by the government as a means of funding 
higher education. There is also the phenomenon of over-juridification, when the 
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existence of an apparently complete set of rules encourages the attitude that a 
normative regime replaces ethics. If it is legal, it is allowed. 
 
It is arguable that it is the combination of opportunities afforded by the removal of 
structural barriers, pressure to perform, societal expectations and the replacement of 
social norms by rules which has led to many of the problems encountered in recent 
years. Take the Chinese Wall; it is no more than words unless kept solid in the mind 
of an ethical person. This can be seen in a share issue in an institution which has 
corporate finance and broking departments. The corporate financiers pressure the 
brokers to place the shares, regardless of their worth. The brokers want their 
commission. The incentive to sell clients poor quality shares is considerable, the 
possibility of being caught minimal. Or take the Arthur Andersen/Enron affair. It was 
the conflict of interest between the management consultancy and the auditing arms 
and the primacy given to financial considerations over professional ethics which led 
to the misconduct. Another example is the conduct of institutions buying securities 
related to ‘sub-prime’ borrowing, as clear an instance as one could identify of the 
abandonment of the fundamental banking principle of only lending to borrowers with 
the long-term capacity to repay and the reversal of the balance of powers between 
risk-avoidance and profit-seeking departments in those institutions. 
 
In all these instances, it is difficult to see how external or internal governance could 
have prevented the behaviour in question. 
 
In a related field, and one close to home for our purposes, the Thatcher era also saw 
the rise of the idea of corporate governance. But the effectiveness of this system is 
unproven. In particular, corporate governance has signally failed in its aim of 
controlling managerial remuneration, when this was the major objective in the initial 
stages of United Kingdom corporate governance. 
 
These examples by themselves do not, of course, provide definitive proof of anything. 
But they do indicate that social controls can be useful and that formal rules do not 
necessarily provide a complete answer. However, we should remember that the old 
system was not perfect. It seems to have failed signally in the scandals which emerged 
in Lloyds in the early 1980s. And the system only worked by relying on the ethos of a 
close-knit group formed by one country’s social and educational system. 
 
It is the belief that formal rules are the answer which has led to the widespread 
popular demand for externally imposed rules. Whether they should become the norm 
is open to doubt. The Enron and WorldCom affairs occurred in a heavily regulated 
environment. The arguments in circulation against such regulation when the Financial 
Services Act was being conceived, such as the difficulty of regulators understanding 
complex products and allowing enough flexibility for development, remain valid 
despite the disappearance of the self-regulatory bodies set up under the Financial 
Services Act 1986. Such rules certainly do have a role to play, but considerable 
thought needs to be given to their application and to other societal elements which 
influence behaviour. One example of effective application may be found in listing 
rules. Norms concerning the track record of companies wishing to list and concerning 
the disclosure of adequate information once listed seem to shown their worth in the 
history of stock markets, which always start with a lack of effective regulation, go 
through a period in which fraudsters exploit the situation by deceiving the public, a 
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collapse ensues, the scandals come to light and regulation is imposed, bringing 
relative stability. Or take the conservative policies of the Canadian regulatory 
authorities, which seem to have played a significant part in the relative insulation of 
that country from the credit crisis; in this instance, the formulation and enforcement of 
that policy may well have been easier given the general conservativism of the 
Canadian banking community. Another example of behavioural regulation which may 
have a profound effect is on the level of basic principles. Take France, where 
irresponsible lending (soutien abusif du crédit) and withdrawal of credit without 
sufficient reason (rupture abusive du crédit) are forbidden. These rules go to the heart 
of a lending culture, reflecting and sustaining a quite different climate. 
 
It may also be the case that well-conceived rules can play a part in lifting ethical 
standards, but the Victorian reforms seem to indicate that they have this effect when 
they constitute the legal manifestation of a social consensus among a significant 
portion of the population. This is unsurprising, indeed it is basic jurisprudence: good 
rules are, inter alia, owned by those subject to them in the sense that they reflect, to a 
reasonable degree, generally held beliefs and are made by authorities enjoying general 
confidence. Rules may well then lend their normative weight and the prestige of a 
legal obligation to such beliefs. In other words, they can back up social norms. 
 
The case studies also seem to show that structural regulation deserves serious 
consideration. If you remove the possibility of transgression, people will transgress a 
lot less. The abolition of barriers between functions in Big Bang and the consequent 
creation of conflicts of interests demonstrates its effectiveness and what happens 
when it is removed. Or take an example of physical structure. In the centre of the 
town of Aix-en-Provence in France many streets are very narrow. Up to the early 
1980s the police spent much time, effort and money on enforcing regulations which 
forbad drivers to park on the pavements. The authorities then thought of a much 
cheaper and more effective measure. They installed bollards, so it was physically 
impossible for a car to go on the pavement. 
 
On the technical level, structural regulation works well because it deals not with 
qualitative, multivalent (‘fuzzy’) matters such as an assessment of the way in which 
behaviour is effected, the reasons for it, the desirability of the behaviour vis-à-vis 
clients and so on, but with the simple, bivalent issue of whether a transaction may 
take place or not. This is the sort of issue for which rules are suited and such 
regulation is simple and easy to understand and enforce. It is arguable therefore that 
structural regulation should play a significant role in a rule-based system. 
 
What are the implications for Islamic Finance? 
 
There is a case for saying that formal rules have their place and can be effective for 
certain tasks, but they must be used sparingly and advisedly. The danger of over-
juridification is particularly relevant in Islamic Finance. There is a natural tendency to 
rely on formal manifestations such as considered, carefully drafted text and bodies 
giving authoritative rulings, to the exclusion of general principles, but as seen above 
this can lead to an ouster of ethics by rules. 
 
It is well worth reconsidering structural regulation. As a guiding principle, ‘lead us 
not into temptation’ is effective and cheap. 
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The third possibility is inducing and keeping a high standard of financial ethics in 
society. This is far more difficult to achieve, of course, but the Victorian example 
shows that one should not lose hope and by careful study we may be able to benefit 
from their mistakes as well as their successes. A similar desire to that of the Victorian 
reformers drives Islamic Finance, with many of those involved actively promoting the 
values of Islam. There are of course numerous Islamic educational projects on hand. 
Is one of them, or a group of them, equivalent in future influence to Rugby School in 
Victorian United Kingdom? 
 
We can also learn from the thatcherite experience, particularly in terms of unexpected 
consequences. It can be argued that systemic changes made on an ideological basis 
can modify personal ethics. But, as noted above, the Thatcher government did not 
intend to produce a society in which money was such a major societal motivation, nor 
did they wish to tilt the balance in financial institutions between caution and profit so 
far that the pressure to act unethically or irresponsibly could not be resisted by 
sufficient individuals and institutions. What they wanted was, inter alia, more 
competition, more transparency and a better service to customers. Margaret Thatcher 
herself may well have, like other reformers, unconsciously assumed that the high 
moral values of her own background were natural, inevitable and did not have to be 
instilled, and those natural value would be sufficient protection against temptation and 
pressure in the new environment. It seems, therefore, that when considering change 
one needs to examine carefully the present situation, its positive aspects and their 
foundation before instituting ‘reforms’ which may remove those foundations. 
 
One might conclude that it is not possible to legislate morality, but it is possible to 
create an environment which encourages or discourages it. 
 
There is at the same time a significant element which might push Islamic Finance 
away from its ethical base, and that is conventional finance. The obligation to work 
alongside and within the conventional system inevitably limits and to some extent 
determines what is achievable in the Islamic system. As we know, it is this 
phenomenon which is at the base of one of the main criticisms of the system, that 
conventional finance has already had this effect: we return to the form/function 
debate. 
 
An additional risk is of a phenomenon similar to the change in motivation of those 
entering the City. As Islamic Finance becomes ever more successful, it may attract 
people who are less interested in the ethical than the financial rewards. 
 
Finally in this regard, millions of pounds are spent every year on governance (in the 
broad sense of the word, including regulation) but, to this author’s knowledge, hardly 
anything is spent on research into its efficacy. A very effective use of some of that 
money would be to fund such research. Perhaps Islamic governance would be a good 
place to start. 
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